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Voluntary action and reflex action - psychophysiological theory... organic factors... the reality of will

The truth of will

It follows from all of the above that will is not a simple phenomenon, but rather a phenomenon composed of several elements. It is not surprising if philosophers investigated its constituent elements, and each of them wanted to show us its truth, by returning it to psychological factors, or to organic factors, or social factors.

B - Organic factors

1 - Voluntary action and reflex action - psychophysiological theory.

It follows from all of the above that the school theory was wrong in saying that will is a force devoid of motives and motives, so contemporary psychologists turned to addressing the issue from a second point of view. From what Ribot said: (Will is action, or the transition from power to action, and that choice comes from the time of will. If it does not turn directly or at the appropriate time into action, it is not distinguished from logical mental processes, 37, Ribot, Maladies de La Volonté, 10 ed.). The simplest form of activity in highly luminous bodies is reflex movement, and will is the final limit of gradual development, the first stage of which is the stage of simple reflex action.

Paine and other association philosophers claimed that the will is a mechanical group whose parts are assembled piece by piece in accordance with the psychological and physiological laws of association. Spencer also claimed that will, like instinct, is a complex reflex action, and he explained this structure by the laws of association, evolution, and heredity. Ribot followed him in this and said: The voluntary action is decomposed into two things: the first is the willing (ego) that perceives conditions without having any influence on them, and the second is the complex physiological psychology that includes the force that drives the action, or prevents it. The will is therefore an impulsive force (pouvoir impulsif). Rather, it is a stage in the process of development that moves from the simple reflex to the abstract meaning. In the simple reflex, the tendency is at the highest level, while in the abstract sense it is at the lowest. Therefore, Maudsley said: In defining will, it is an impulse emanating from an idea (impulse by ideas). And . But this definition is incomplete, because will is not only an impulsive force, but at the same time it is a stopping force (pouvoir d'arrêt), and it is accompanied by all the physiological movements that constitute the phenomenon of (inbibition), and we also add to this that the will is a special, singular reflection for them. Stop, and this saying has a real positive meaning from both the psychological and physiological points of view. From the physiological point of view, we say: The voluntary action differs from the reflex action, because the stimulus in a simple reflex action is followed by a set of limited movements, and it also differs from complex reflexes, because it results from the entire nervous organization. It follows the totality of the nature of the seriousness, and from the psychological point of view, we say: The state of feeling compared to a voluntary act is the result of a psychological-physiological process, and it is not the reason for the occurrence of the act. Because the desire's (ego) observes conditions, and does not create them. Therefore, will is not a simple essence, but rather a composite result of all the psychological and physiological processes preceding it.

Discussion .
- These theories are incomplete from a physiological point of view, and they remain to this day - despite the efforts of scientists. It includes many controversial issues. However, we do not find any decisive objection in the objections to which it was directed. Rather, we find that the progress of neurophysiology has reason to support it. Therefore, the study of the conditional reflex has completed our knowledge of the reality of the visual-motor action. Also, the mechanism of desistance - which is an incident of nerve interference - has become completely clear today, thanks to Labeck's investigations. Our conception of the structure of the nervous system and its effect, and our knowledge of the functions of the brain and its motor centers, have all supported the idea of ​​the coordination of nervous phenomena, their arrangement, their relation to one another, and their sequence from the simple elementary reflex to the complex voluntary action. However, these physiological theories are not devoid of shortcomings in some aspects, because they consider feeling to be a secondary, superfluous, and worthless phenomenon (Epiphénomène). These theories expose us to many similarities, and they deny the danger of developing feeling (Prise de Concience) and its impact on the stages of psychological development.

In short, explaining high psychological effectiveness with physiological factors reminds us of all the materialistic theories that we refuted at the beginning of this book when talking about the relationship of the soul and the body. Physiological factors are necessary for voluntary action, but they are not sufficient to explain it, as if there is an excess of activity in the brain that does not appear without it, but despite its need for it, it is not gathered in it. Whenever scientists try to explain this complex activity with physiological factors, in the end, their interpretation goes outside the scope of precise scientific research, and they fall into hypotheses that are almost far from reality, as William James did when explaining the physiological and psychological conditions for the visual-motor action. He attributed voluntary action to conceptual and motor action. He fell into the similarity with other imaginary scientists who philosophize at the expense of science. He added to his deep analysis the idea of ​​psychological effort that determines action, and he says to the thing, “Be,” and it is (Fiat volontaire). Were it not for the lack of a physiological explanation, it would not be needed. (William James) to this strange idea.