ادراك المكان .. معرفة العالم الخارجي .. نظرية كانت .. كتاب علم النَّفس جميل صَليبا

Perceiving place... knowing the outside world... Kant's theory

Perception of place

What is the place ?
The place can either be abstract, or it can be tangible and personal.
If it were abstract, it would be imaginary like mathematical space, and this means that the abstract space is a homogeneous medium that has no boundaries or sensory characteristics. It is an infinite void that does not vary depending on the bodies in it. It is a mathematical quantity, because it accepts measurement and is divided into an infinite number of parts.

Even if it is individual, it is realized in sense, bringing together the attributes required by bodies, such as color, the finiteness of boundaries, difference, and so on.

Therefore, place has an abstract meaning and a personalized image, and we now want to know which of them is the origin and which is a branch. Is the meaning of the abstract place generated from the awareness of the tangible extension, or is it generated from the mind in an a priori and innate manner?

1 - Kant's theory
This last opinion is Kant’s opinion. This philosopher, when researching the value of mathematics and scientific certainty, claimed that place is an a priori meaning that the mind extracts from within it and that it is a pure mental image prior to the images of the tangible world (pure a priori (of sensibility).

But the evidence that Kant provided is not sufficient to convince us that the perception of place is independent of sense perceptions.

Let us now discuss this evidence:
The first evidence:
- Kant said: The meaning of place is not generated from sense perceptions or from external experience because we cannot perceive external things independent of it, and independent of each other, except after conceptualizing the place, so all. He is capable, and every capable person requires a place. This body of space that he imagined was not generated by sensory experience, because it is one of the conditions for its possibility, and therefore the intelligible place is prior to the sensible extension.

Discuss it:
This evidence has no meaning unless the sensation is devoid of extension, let alone if the sensory experience is composed of sensations with extension. Yes, if sensations themselves were devoid of extension, then the perception of place must precede the experience. But if we assume that extension is an inherent characteristic of sensation, the evidence for its value is lost. Because this last hypothesis makes sensory extension an experimental matter, do you not see that you perceive external things independently of you, and at the same time imagine that they have extension? There is no need, then, to generate sensory extension from the eyes, because this extension is experimental, and is inherent in sound, color, smell, and other symptoms, and this last opinion is closer to common sense than Kant’s hypothesis.

The second evidence:
- Kant said: “We cannot imagine the loss of a place even though we can imagine the disappearance of things from the place. (1) What this means is that imagining a place is an inevitable necessity in perceiving the external world. I now see on my table a watch, an inkwell, a pen, and a book, and they are always there in front of my eyes, necessary for my touch. However, I can imagine it disappearing from my sight. As for the place occupied by these things, I cannot imagine its disappearance ever, and this indicates that imagining it is necessary. This necessity cannot be generated from experience, because experience, as you have seen, is in constant change.

Discuss it:
This evidence is based on careful psychological observation. But this observation does not require that the perception of place be an innate perception prior to experience. Yes, visualizing the place is necessary, but where did this necessity come from? The answer to that is that it was not conceived
Place is inherent in every finite perceiver and common to all sensations. Its disappearance is prevented by the disappearance of tangible things. Place is a common characteristic between the pen, inkwell, and book. Therefore, it is easy and difficult for the pen to disappear, beyond your imagination, and it is difficult for the place occupied by this pen to disappear. . I do not say it is impossible, because philosophers can imagine an entity outside the place. God, in the Eleatic doctrine, exists outside of time and space, just as “the thing in itself,” or “nomen,” in Kant’s doctrine, is devoid of extension. Yes, we cannot imagine it physically, but we can rationalize it. This indicates that the mind can free itself from the constraints of experience.

The third evidence:
Space is infinite, and experience is finite, meaning that everything is external. Limited to others. Therefore, the perception of an infinite space cannot be generated from a limited, finite experience.

Discuss it:
If we explain the meaning of infinity, this evidence is invalid.
What is infinity?
Infinity is not something actually achieved, but rather an imaginary meaning of unlimited quantity. Or it depicts a place after which there is no place.
The perception of externality and this meaning can be generated from experience, because each body is limited to others. There is no end to the connection of bodies with each other. Every body is limited to another body and location is a characteristic common to all bodies. This prevents the existence of a body! A body after it, as it were, prevents a place that has no place after it. Therefore, place is not a purely rational concept, but rather an experimental concept.

Fourth evidence:
- You can specify some of the properties of a place without relying on it, such as when you say: A place has three dimensions: length, width, and depth. This indicates that the perception of the place was not generated from experience. In response, we say that your statement: “The place has three dimensions” is an empirical judgment, not a rational judgment, because objects in reality include three dimensions. If this ruling were purely rational, it would be appropriate for all geometry. However, in non-Euclidian geometry, for example, scientists were able to imagine geometric facts based on more than three dimensions. To the senses, and this indicates that the property of three dimensions is not a mental property, but rather an experiential property.

Fifth evidence:
- If the perception of place were generated from experience, geometric facts would be unnecessary. However, the geometric truths are absolute, and their rulings are certain, and experience does not provide absolute certainty. Moreover, the geometric space is homogeneous in parts, meaning that all its sections are the same. Otherwise, geometry would not have been possible, because it only investigates the properties of space, and if its facts are correct in this part of space It was true in others. Were it not for the homogeneity of the place, the facts of geometry would not apply to all its parts. The homogeneous place is not generated from experience, but rather it is generated from the mind and precedes experience.

In discussing this evidence, we say that it does not prevent the generation of the image of a personal place from experience and sensation, but rather it proves that the place imagined by the mathematician is purely rational, far from sense, and that the facts of geometry are not true unless this abstract place is homogeneous and absolute.

We do not deny the effect of the mind in creating the perception of place, because a place with homogeneous parts is not a personal image, but rather an abstract intelligible one. But we believe that the senses inform us of a kind of sensory extension.

It generates in our souls the image of this extension, and then thought derives from this image the meaning of the abstract place. As for geometry, it investigates the properties of abstract space, not the properties of sensory extension. However, its facts are not conventional or conventional, but rather related to experience. When researching the origin of mathematical meanings, we will show how the mind rises from sensory observations to mathematical meanings. The mathematician sees circular shapes in nature. Like the sections of trees, he strips the meaning of the circle from it, and gives it a definition, so the circle becomes, in his view, a reasonable meaning, far from sense and unconnected with experience. But we believe that mathematical meanings are the end of the perfection of sensory images. And the abstract place is the end of the perfection of sensory extension. This is what we will try to prove in logic and in our theory of knowledge.